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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

14 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR  
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN  
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : SE-24 (Formerly SIE-4): Communist Charges of  
US Use of Biological Warfare

1. The attached draft estimate is forwarded for review.
2. It is requested that your representative meet with us at 10:00 Tuesday, 18 March, in Room 146 South Building, to discuss this draft estimate, and to incorporate at that time additional pertinent contributions which you may have.
3. We are in the process of preparing supporting TABS covering propaganda and technical aspects of the campaign. We will have these ready for the meeting but will not try to coordinate them at that time. We recommend that the TABS be coordinated by the representatives at a subsequent meeting and cleared by the IAC by telephone concurrences.

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "B"

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SECURITY INFORMATION

75236-d

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 March 1952

SUBJECT: SE-24: COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE OF BIOLOGICAL  
WARFARE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the significance of the Communist psychological warfare campaign alleging use of biological warfare by the US in Korea and China.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The current large-scale propaganda campaign charging US forces with bacteriological warfare in Korea and China has been carefully coordinated throughout the Communist Orbit. It has been directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. It began with a charge by the North Korean Foreign Minister on 23 February, and has since been heavily emphasized by all Communist propaganda media.

2. On 6 March the Peiping People's Daily, an official Communist organ stated that the US had sent a total of 148 planes on germ warfare

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missions over Manchuria during the preceding week, and had in addition bombed and strafed at least one area in Manchuria.

3. On 8 March statements by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai and an editorial in the official Chinese Communist Party organ:

- a. Charged that American use of BW weapons was aimed at "wrecking the armistice talks in Korea, prolonging and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and instigating new wars";
- b. Called upon the "peace-loving people of the world" to "rise up and put an end to the sinful designs of the United States Government."

4. Communist and Communist front organizations have protested to the UN and to the International Red Cross against US use of bacteriological warfare. To date, however, no official representations have been made by any Communist government.

5. It is significant that the accusations regarding bacteriological warfare have been directed almost exclusively against the US rather than UN forces generally.

6. The campaign has been supported by an extremely large body of alleged "evidence." From a technical standpoint, however, both the Communist description of the attacks and this "evidence" are filled with flaws and inconsistencies.

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7. Elaborate local efforts have been taken to alert Communist military personnel and civilians to carry out countermeasures. It is probable that many of the Communist military personnel in the combat area have been convinced that the reports of the attack are authentic.

8. Last spring there was evidence of extensive typhus, cholera, typhoid, and smallpox in North Korea. There is at present no evidence of a recurrence, on a similar scale, of these conditions. However, the absence of evidence does not preclude the possibility that these conditions have recurred. In view of the season and existing public health conditions in North Korea, Communist leaders may be expecting an early outbreak of epidemics of serious proportions.

9. Although Communist forces in Korea are estimated to have the capability of conducting small-scale BW attacks, they are ill prepared either to guard against the possibility of such an effort backfiring into their own ranks, or to defend themselves against possible UN retaliation in kind. If the Soviets provided the means, Communist capabilities for offensive employment of BW might become substantial. However, UN vulnerability to Communist BW attacks is probably far less than Communist vulnerability to UN BW attacks.

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#### POSSIBLE PURPOSES OF THE CAMPAIGN

10. A major purpose of the campaign is almost certainly to serve internal propaganda needs. In this respect the following objectives are probably most important:

- a. The establishment of an alibi in anticipation of an early outbreak of epidemics in Communist China and Korea with which Communist authorities might be unable to cope;
- b. The stimulation of civilian and military public health and sanitation efforts in anticipation of early large-scale epidemics;
- c. The stimulation of renewed fighting zeal and hatred of the US among Communist troops, whose recent idleness may have resulted in deteriorating discipline and morale, and in friction between North Korean and Chinese Communist personnel.

11. The scale and nature of the campaign are such, however, as to suggest purposes beyond those of internal propaganda. Such broader purposes may be limited solely to general foreign propaganda aims, or may involve preparations for some early major Communist move.

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12. Among probable foreign propaganda purposes are:
- a. To lend weight to the "hate America" campaign;
  - b. To discredit the US in the eyes of its allies and the rest of the world;
  - c. To arouse fears that the US is aggravating an already explosive situation in Korea and in the East-West struggle.

13. Among possible foreign propaganda purposes are:
- a. To strengthen the moral position of the Communists in the event of Communist renewal of large-scale military operations, possible including the use of BW;
  - b. To weaken the moral position of the US in the event that large-scale hostilities are undertaken in Korea and the US attempts to expand the Korean conflict.

14. The campaign is entirely consistent with and could be in preparation for an early major Communist move in the truce negotiations or a renewal of large-scale military action. However, the current campaign does not, in itself, provide a basis for determining whether a major move is imminent.

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15. There are no firm indications that a Communist military offensive is imminent in Korea or elsewhere, and there is no firm evidence regarding future Communist moves in the Korean cease-fire negotiations.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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14 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 March 1952

SUBJECT: SE-24: COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE OF BIOLOGICAL  
WARFARE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the significance of the Communist psychological warfare campaign alleging use of biological warfare by the US in Korea and China.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The current large-scale propaganda campaign charging US forces with bacteriological warfare in Korea and China has been carefully coordinated throughout the Communist Orbit. It has been directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. It began with a charge by the North Korean Foreign Minister on 23 February, and has since been heavily emphasized by all Communist propaganda media.
2. On 6 March the Peiping People's Daily, an official Communist organ stated that the US had, during the preceding week, sent a total

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of 448 planes on germ warfare missions over Manchuria, and had in addition bombed and strafed at least one area in Manchuria.

3. On 8 March statements by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai and an editorial in the official Chinese Communist Party organ:

- a. Charged that American use of BW weapons was aimed at "wrecking the armistice talks in Korea, prolonging and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and instigating new wars";
- b. Called upon the "peace-loving people of the world" to "rise up and put an end to the sinful designs of the United States Government."

4. Communist and Communist front organizations have protested to the UN and to the International Red Cross against US use of bacteriological warfare. To date, however, no official representations have been made by any Communist government.

5. It is significant that the accusations regarding bacteriological warfare have been directed almost exclusively against the US rather than UN forces generally.

6. The campaign has been supported by an extremely large body of alleged "evidence." From a technical standpoint, however, both the Communist description of the attacks and this "evidence" are filled with flaws and inconsistencies.

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*have been taken*

7. [There is evidence of] elaborate local efforts to alert Communist military personnel and civilians to carry out counter-measures. It is probable that many of the Communist military personnel in the combat area have been convinced that the reports of the attack are authentic.

8. Last spring there was evidence of extensive typhus, cholera, typhoid and smallpox in North Korea. There is no evidence of a recurrence, on a similar scale, of these conditions. However, the absence of evidence does not preclude the possibility that these conditions have recurred and the situation in North Korea is such that Communist leaders may be expecting an early outbreak of epidemics of serious proportions.

9. Although Communist forces in Korea are estimated to have the capability of conducting small-scale BW attacks, they are ill prepared either to guard against the possibility of such an effort backfiring into their own ranks, or to defend themselves against possible UN retaliation in kind. If the Soviets provided the *means* [munitions], Communist capabilities for offensive employment of BW might become substantial. However, UN vulnerability to Communist BW attacks is probably far less than Communist vulnerability to UN BW attacks.

[ 10. There are no firm indications that a Communist military offensive is imminent in Korea or elsewhere, and there is no firm

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evidence regarding future Communist moves in the Korean cease-fire negotiations.

#### POSSIBLE PURPOSES OF THE CAMPAIGN

11. A major purpose of the campaign is almost certainly to serve internal propaganda needs. In this respect the following objectives are probably most important:

- a. The establishment of an alibi in anticipation of an early outbreak of epidemics in Communist China and Korea with which Communist authorities might be unable to cope;
- b. The stimulation of civilian and military public health and sanitation efforts in anticipation of early large-scale epidemics;
- c. The stimulation of renewed fighting zeal and hatred of the US among Communist troops, whose recent idleness may have resulted in deteriorating discipline and morale, and in friction between North Korean and Chinese Communist personnel.

12. The scale and nature of the campaign are such, however, as to suggest purposes beyond those of internal propaganda. Such broader purposes may be limited solely to general foreign propaganda aims, or may involve preparations for some early major Communist move.

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13. Among probable foreign propaganda purposes are:

- a. To lend weight to the "hate America" campaign;
- b. To discredit the US in the eyes of its allies and the rest of the world;
- c. To arouse fears that the US is aggravating an already explosive situation in Korea and in the East-West struggle.

14. Among possible foreign propaganda purposes are:

- a. To strengthen the moral position of the Communists in the event of Communist renewal of large-scale military operations, possibly including the use of BW;
- b. To weaken the moral position of the US in the event that large-scale hostilities are undertaken in Korea and the US attempts to expand the Korean conflict.

15. The campaign is entirely consistent with and could be in preparation for an early major Communist move in the truce negotiations or a renewal of large-scale military action. However, the current campaign does not, in itself, provide a basis for determining whether a major move is imminent. { On balance, there

are no other indications that an early major Communist move in the truce negotiations or a renewal of large-scale military action is imminent.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

13 March 1952

Subject: Proposed Addition -- SE-24

The undersigned members of the task team for SE 24 suggest that the following be inserted as the first paragraph under CONCLUSIONS:

Note: Other than an analysis of Communist propaganda surrounding the BW charges, there is little positive intelligence available on which to judge the Communist motives underlying these charges or on which to assess the probable Communist courses of action which these charges might portend. The analysis of Communist propaganda in the absence of other intelligence is not a definitive guide to Communist intentions. The following conclusions should be noted in the context of these limitations.

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